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The mainstream science and standard economic analysis together tell us that the 
Australian agricultural and resource industries are likely to be affected profoundly 
by climate change and the global response to it. They are likely to be affected 
profoundly  whether  or  not  there  is  an  effective  global  mitigation  effort,  and 
whatever the nature of Australia’s contribution to that effort.  
The Australian economy  and community  as a whole, and the agricultural and 
resource sectors within the national economy, would maximise their prospects for 
future prosperity if there were comprehensive global mitigation, within which all 
significant  economies  were  subject  to  quantitative  emissions  constraints,  and 
trade  in  emissions  entitlements  introduced  similar  costs  of  abatement  at  the 
margin across all substantial economic activities in all substantial economies.  
This is easier said than done. The building of a comprehensive global agreement 
has required some countries to move ahead of others, and national mitigation 
regimes will be operating in an ad hoc world for some time. There are immense 
challenges  to  efficient  global  and  national  resource  allocation,  to  effective 
operation  of  a  multilateral  trading  system,  and  to  public  policy  integrity  more 
generally, in the ad hoc world that accompanies the movement to greenhouse 
gas mitigation in some countries and not others, and for some activities and not 
others. 
This  paper  begins  by  summarising  some  conclusions  of  the  Garnaut  Climate 
Change Review (Garnaut, 2008) on how the Australian agricultural and resource 
industries are likely to be affected by climate change and its mitigation. It then 
focuses on one important and difficult issue. This is the application of policies to 
support trade-exposed, emissions-intensive industries prior to the application of a 
comprehensive global agreement and similar emissions pricing in all substantial 
economies. 
THE  PLATINUM  AGE,  THE  GLOBAL  FINANCIAL  CRISIS  AND  CLIMATE 
CHANGE 
When  I  addressed  this  conference  three  years  ago,  I  drew  attention  to  the 
implications for the resources sector of sustained rapid economic growth in the 
large  developing  countries,  first  of  all  China.  I  was  later  to  describe  the 
phenomenon of sustained rapid growth in the early twenty first century as the 
Platinum Age. In the early twenty first century, the beneficent processes of rapid, modern economic growth were entrenched in the populous countries of Asia—
most importantly China, but also India, and other large countries of South and 
Southeast  Asia.  In  the  third  quarter  of  the  twentieth  century,  sustained  rapid 
economic growth had spread beyond its places of origin in Western Europe and 
its overseas offshoots in North America and Australasia, and the special case of 
Japan, into a number of smaller countries in East Asia. The large economies of 
Asia had established the necessary conditions for modern economic growth in 
the last quarter of the century: China from 1978; Indonesia from the mid-1980s; 
India from 1991. In some early years of this century—one might now say in the 
years leading up to the Great Crash of 2008—modern economic growth on a 
global  scale  had  reached  its  apogee.  A  higher  proportion  of  the  world’s 
population  was  participating  in  sustained  rapid  growth  in  productivity  and 
incomes than ever before. 
Rapid global growth in the Platinum Age was highly intensive in use of metals 
and energy. This was because growth was concentrated in countries at stages of 
development  in  which  increased  economic  activity  used  metals  and  energy 
intensively.  
Supplying rapidly growing global demand would require continuing expansion of 
productive capacity in the resources industries. Prices and expectations of prices 
would need to remain high enough to induce the necessary investment. For a 
considerable period, real prices of metals and energy would need to remain well 
above the average levels of the last quarter of the twentieth century. In this, the 
Platinum Age of the early twenty first century would be like two earlier periods of 
strong  global  economic  expansion:  the  late  nineteenth  century  into  the  early 
twentieth  up  to  the  First World War;  and  the  “Golden  Age”  after  the  Second 
World War up to the cessation of rapid growth in Japan in 1974.  
I noted three years ago that most resources prices were then as high as would 
be necessary to induce the required increases in supply on a continuing basis.  
Market prices were to go much higher in the subsequent two and a half years. 
This was because markets had not anticipated the China boom in particular and 
global Platinum Age growth in general, and there was concern about the short-
term  adequacy  of  supply  capacity.  The  markets  would  have  caught  up,  even 
without a Great Crash. After a lag, supplies would have expanded more rapidly 
and prices ease, although prices would need to remain at levels that were on 
average substantially higher than in the late twentieth century.  
The resources boom that grew from the Platinum Age raised Australia’s terms of 
trade  to  exceptional  levels.  It  added  about  12  percent  to  average  Australian incomes in the four or five years to the peak of export prices in the middle of 
2008. By 2008, the investment in new capacity was making a large additional 
contribution to Australian incomes, beyond the lift from the terms of trade. High 
levels of investment were set to expand global production and to bring resources 
prices  back  to  historically  high  but  more  moderate  levels—before  the  Global 
Financial Crisis precipitated the Great Crash in global economic activity from the 
third quarter of 2008.  
The Climate Change Review discusses how the resources boom was the other 
side of the coin to an acceleration of growth in global greenhouse gas emissions 
in  the  early  twenty  first  century  (Garnaut,  2008,  Chapter  3).  Sustained  rapid 
growth in the Asian developing countries—especially but not only China—meant 
that  global  growth,  the  energy  intensity  of  that  growth,  and  the  emissions 
intensity of energy growth were all much higher than in the most widely used 
scenarios applied by the IPCC (IPCC, 2000 and 2007) and the Stern Review 
(Stern,  2007).  This  at  once  made  mitigation  more  urgent  and  important,  and 
more difficult and expensive. 
I presented the Final Report of the Garnaut Climate Change Review to the Prime 
Minister of Australia on the morning of the largest one-day points fall on the New 
York Stock Exchange in history.  
The Global Financial Crisis has provided the context for all of the discussion of 
the Final Report, and of the Government’s White Paper on a Carbon Pollution 
Reduction  Scheme  (Commonwealth  of  Australia,  2008).  The  crisis  and 
associated  global  recession  has  affected  perceptions  of  what  is  possible  in 
relation to mitigation in the near term. It has for a time stopped the rapid growth 
in emissions of the early twenty first century. Since mid-2008, emissions from the 
developed economies as a whole, and from China, have been falling. 
It is a matter of great importance for climate change policy whether the Global 
Financial Crisis represents a temporary pause in the Platinum Age, or brings it to 
an  end.  My  address  to  the  CSIRO  Conference,  Greenhouse  2009:  Climate 
Change and Resources, in Perth next month will focus on the implications of the 
Global Financial Crisis for the global mitigation task, and for the political economy 
of  mitigation  in  Australia  and  abroad.  For  this  paper,  I  will  simply  assert  a 
conclusion: that the current crisis may shift the trajectories of “business as usual” 
emissions growth by perhaps two or three years, but is unlikely significantly to 
affect  the  slope  of  the  curve  in  subsequent  years.  For  the  climate  change 
cognoscenti, it may bring down “business-as-usual” emissions in 2030 and later 
years to a bit below the levels that the Review thought to be most likely (Garnaut, 
2008, Chapter 3 and Garnaut et al, 2008). It may bring them close to the highest of  the  wide  range  of  scenarios  generated  by  the  IPCC:  the  “extreme”  A1FI 
scenario. It happens that the A1FI scenario and its implications for climate and 
for  human  activity  was  the  basis  for  the  Review’s  modelling  of  the  costs  of 
climate change and the benefits of mitigation.  
It is an implication of this view of the future of the Platinum Age, that Australia 
can look forward to long term average export prices for minerals, energy and 
metals  considerably  above  the  levels  of  the  late  twentieth  century,  although 
below the levels at the heights of the recent boom. . The Global Financial Crisis 
gives us a little breathing space, but mitigation of climate change remains urgent 
and of central importance. We will need the breathing space, and we will need to 
use  it  well,  if  there  is  to  be  a  mitigation  outcome  that  future  generations  of 
Australians and others judge to have been satisfactory.  
AUSTRALIA’S INTEREST IN STRONG GLOBAL MITIGATION 
The  Climate  Change  Review  sought  to  assess  whether  it  was  worthwhile  for 
Australia  to  participate  in  a  global  mitigation  effort,  within  which  it  would  be 
required to play its full proportionate part. It also examined the extent of global 
mitigation,  with  Australia  playing  its  proportionate  part,  that  was  best  for 
Australia.  The  questions  are  different  from,  and  as  it  turns  out  much  more 
complex than, the question underlying other large quantitative studies: whether 
the benefits of mitigation would exceed the costs for the world as a whole (Stern, 
2007; Cline, 1992, 2007; Nordhaus, 1994, 2007).  
All systematic studies of the costs and benefits of climate change mitigation must 
come  to  grips  with  some  difficult  conceptual  issues.  First,  all  of  the  costs  of 
climate change mitigation, but only some of the benefits (through reduced costs 
of  climate  change),  are  amenable  to  quantification  using  standard  economic 
methodologies. Second, the costs of mitigation come early and the benefits of 
reduced climate change late, so that an appropriate social discount rate must be 
used to convert values at widely different points of time into present values.   
The  Review  handles  the  first  issue  by  separating  out  four  types  of  costs  of 
climate change (Garnaut, 2008, Chapter 1). Types 1 (fairly precisely) and Type 2 
(approximately) are amenable to economic analysis using standard computable 
general equilibrium analysis. These effects relate to standard economic impacts 
experienced through market processes. The application of computable general 
equilibrium modelling many decades into the future stretches the technical limits 
of the models, and no attempt is made to provide precise quantitative estimates 
of the costs and benefits of mitigation beyond the end of the twenty first century. 
By  the  end  of  the  century,  the  annual  net  benefits  of  mitigation  are  strongly positive, so that the temporal truncation of the analysis leads to underestimation 
of Type 1 and 2 net benefits of mitigation.  
The  mainstream  science  recognises  a  high  degree  of  uncertainty  about  the 
impacts of climate change. The modelling of Type 1and Type 2 effects focuses 
on the mid-points of the probability distributions of possible outcomes. Type 3 
impacts  recognise  the  additional  costs  associated  with  human  risk  aversion 
related  to  bad  outcomes,  with  outcomes  being  uncertain,  and  with  possible 
outcomes including some that are much more unfavourable than the median.  
Type 4 recognises that some important impacts of climate change, and therefore 
benefits of its avoidance, are not felt by humans through market processes. The 
Review seeks to assess Type 3 and Type 4 effects, as well as Type 1 and Type 
2 effects beyond the twenty first century, and to bring them to account fully but 
qualitatively.  
The  Review  found  that  the  range  of  appropriate  social  discount  rates  for 
converting future into present values included the appropriate market discount 
rates for sovereign debt in a developed country (Garnaut, 2008, Chapter 1). The 
conclusions about whether mitigation advanced Australian interests, and about 
the degree of mitigation that advanced Australia’s interests most, were robust 
across the range of appropriate discount rates.    
The analysis revealed that Australia was the most vulnerable of the developed 
countries to unmitigated climate change. Of all the developed countries, Australia 
would seem to have the greatest interest in early and strong mitigation. It follows 
by implication that the best level of global mitigation for Australia is the highest 
level to which the international community can agree.   
For  any  given  extent  of  Australian  mitigation,  the  costs  are  much  lower  if 
mitigation is  undertaken  within  a  global  regime  than through  unilateral  action. 
There is negligible climate change benefit from Australia acting alone, so any 
unilateral action should be transitional, temporary, and directed at developing an 
effective global agreement. 
The formal modelling of quantifiable impacts suggests that through the first half 
of this century, strong global action directed at greenhouse gas concentrations of 
550ppm, with Australia playing its full proportionate part, would reduce growth in 
the value of Australian incomes by a bit above one tenth of a percentage point 
per annum. This loss could be expected to be restored in present value terms 
through the second half of the century. The additional benefits of mitigation—the 
possibilities away from the median of the income distribution, and the non-market 
effects, together with conventional market effects beyond the modelling horizons to the end of the century—tip the balance strongly in favour of mitigation. The 
same lines of analysis indicate that Australia’s national interest would be served 
by the strongest feasible global mitigation—for example, a global mitigation effort 
directed  at  holding  concentrations  of  greenhouse gases  in  the  atmosphere to 
450ppm rather than 550ppm. For 450ppm, the costs of mitigation are higher than 
for  550ppm,  but  these  higher  costs  are  amply  justified  by  larger  benefits  of 
reduced climate change. 
MITIGATION AND THE AUSTRALIAN RESOURCE INDUSTRIES 
A considerable part of Australia’s vulnerability to climate change is concentrated 
in the resource and agricultural industries.  
The vulnerability of agriculture derives mainly from supply side effects. Much of 
Australian agriculture  operates close to the upper margins of the temperature 
ranges at which agriculture is undertaken successfully, and close to the lower 
margins of the ranges of access to water. Higher temperature threatens output 
directly in many areas and for many crops. Higher temperature also increases 
evaporation  and  reduces  run-off,  and  so  reduces  access  to  moisture.  In  the 
conditions of southern Australia, run-off declines by around 15 percent for each 
percentage point rise in temperature. In addition, climate change is expected to 
be  associated  with  major  changes  in  rainfall  patterns,  which  are  likely  to  be 
unfavourable to Australian agricultural production. The rainfall changes could be 
devastatingly unfavourable.  
The vulnerability of the resource industries to climate change derives mainly from 
different  considerations.  Higher  temperatures  and  intensification  of  extreme 
weather  events  raise  the  cost  of  capital  items.  However,  the  largest  effects 
operate  through  global  demand  and  prices  for  resource-based  products. 
Unmitigated climate change would slow growth in countries, notably the large 
Asian economies, which  account for a large  and  growing proportion of global 
minerals and energy demand. Lower growth in these countries and in the world 
as a whole would reduce Australian export prices. Incidentally, the largest single 
loser through these terms of trade effects of unmitigated climate change is the 
coal industry.  
Coal exports are  also  highly  vulnerable  to  distorted  mitigation policies in  coal 
using countries. The resource industries in general, and none more than coal, 
have a powerful interest in effective global mitigation, through processes that are 
built around comprehensive and similar emissions pricing across industries and 
countries. The agricultural and forestry industries, viewed broadly to encompass land use in 
general,  have  large  potential  for  relatively  low  cost  sequestration  of  carbon 
emissions. They thus have considerable scope for generation of credits from any 
comprehensive  regime of  carbon  accounting, which systematically rewards  all 
sequestration and penalises all emissions. The Review notes that the utilisation 
of this potential is potentially transformative for the mitigation task, especially for 
Australia and its developing country neighbours, but also for the world as a whole 
(Garnaut, 2008,  Chapter  22).  If  agriculture,  land use  change  and  forestry  are 
subject to similar incentives to economise on emissions as other major sectors of 
the economy, the generation of carbon credits is likely to be a major source of 
income  in  rural  Australia.  The  Review  suggested  that  Australia  should  favour 
comprehensive carbon accounting and the bringing to account of all emissions 
and sequestration within this sector in the global emissions regime. There are 
technical barriers to the development of comprehensive carbon accounting for 
use  in  domestic  and  global  mitigation  regimes.  These  issues  should  be  the 
subject of a major research effort, in which Australia has both strong interests 
and comparative advantage in research capacity.  
LIMITS TO ADAPTATION 
The costs of unmitigated or weakly mitigated climate change would be affected 
significantly  by  the  efficiency  with  which  production  systems  adapt  to  higher 
temperatures and changed patterns of precipitation. The efficiency of adaptive 
responses will, in turn, be  affected inter alia by the economy’s and industry’s 
capacity  for  innovation,  the  availability  and  dissemination  of  knowledge  of 
possible changes in climate, the effectiveness of markets for productive inputs 
(notably water) and products, and the effectiveness of government in correcting 
market failures in adjustment to large and far-reaching change (Garnaut, 2008, 
Chapter 15). 
The  Australian  agricultural  and  resource  industries  are  renowned  for  their 
innovative capacity in response to changes in opportunity. This will be important 
to the survival of agriculture in many areas. In Australia, many changes from 
weakly  mitigated  climate  change  would  require  innovation  beyond  the  normal 
capacity of human systems if anything like current production levels were to be 
maintained.  Unmitigated  climate  change  is  likely  to  render  unproductive  large 
parts of established agricultural land in southern Australia, and more generally 
through the Murray Darling Basin. Adaptation would allow us to make the most of 
unfavourably changed circumstances.  In many circumstances, the appropriate 
adaptive response is likely to be the cessation of agriculture, and depopulation.   
 ‘COMPENSATING’ AFFECTED INDUSTRIES  
The agricultural and resource industries are currently highly emissions-intensive. 
Once the two broad sectors are included in an emissions trading scheme, entities 
within  them  will  be  the  locus  of  legal  compliance  for  a  high  proportion  of 
emissions.  
The  Review  draws  a  distinction  between  the  point  of  legal  incidence  of  the 
emissions  trading  scheme—the  entity  that  is  responsible  for  surrendering  a 
permit  with  emissions—and  the  point  of  economic  incidence.  The  point  of 
economic incidence will lie with the entity within the economy that actually bears 
the cost of the permit. The two points are different to the extent that the entity 
required to surrender the  permit is able to pass on the costs to purchasers of its 
goods and services.  
When  output  is  not  internationally  tradeable,  as  with  electricity  generation,  or 
supplies  of  fresh  food  into  domestic  markets,  there  will  be  considerable 
opportunity to pass on the costs of emissions permits to final users. In these 
circumstances, the emissions-reducing effects of emissions pricing occur mainly 
through  reductions  in  demand  for  the  more  expensive  final  products.  As 
competitively priced low-emissions substitutes emerge over time—more likely for 
electricity than for fresh foods—there will be progressively less opportunity for 
firms using emissions-intensive processes to pass on costs, and substitution in 
supply provides more scope for abatement.  
Most of the output of the Australian agricultural and resource industries is sold 
onto international markets. There is limited scope for passing on increases on the 
costs  of  emissions  permits  to  final  users,  until  such  time  as  most  competing 
production  is  subject  to  similar  emissions  constraints.  If  and  when  there  is 
comparable  carbon  pricing  in  countries  which  are  the  location  for  competing 
production,  the  main  constraint  on  the  pass-through  of  costs  will  be  the 
availability of substitutes produced through less emissions-intensive processes. 
There  has  been  much  discussion  of  whether  and  in  what  circumstances  it  is 
appropriate  to  ‘compensate’  firms  for  the  requirement  to  acquit  emissions 
permits. There is no economic case for ‘compensation’ where competitors are 
subject to  comparable  constraints on emissions: sales  into the domestic non-
traded  sector,  and  into  an  international  market  after  the  general  adoption  of 
comparable  emissions  pricing.  Where  competitors  are  subject  to  comparable 
carbon constraints, the presence of carbon pricing will raise the capital value of 
some  enterprises,  applying  low-emissions  means  of  meeting  consumer requirements,  and  lower  the  capital  value  of  others,  applying  high-emissions 
means of meeting consumer requirements.  
Such changes in asset values are part of the normal rise and fall of elements of a 
market  economy.  The  changes  in  relative  prices  provide  incentives  for  new 
patterns of production and consumption, and drive the process of adjustment to 
lower carbon intensity. The case for compensating losers is no stronger than for 
compensating  for  any  other  change  in  policy—from  taxation  to  interest  rates. 
Perhaps of closer relevance to the subject of this paper, the fall in asset values in 
some enterprises following the taxation of the emissions externality generates no 
stronger  case  for  ‘compensation’  than  any  other  instance  of  government 
introducing measures to reduce the external costs of some economic activity—
from discouraging tobacco smoking or the consumption of alcohol or unhealthy 
foods, to controls on the use of asbestos. There are winners and losers from 
taxation of or controls on negative externalities, and the gains and losses are 
recognised as being part of the risk of business.    
THE DREADFUL PROBLEM OF SHIELDING TRADE-EXPOSED INDUSTRIES 
Different  issues  arise  when  an  emissions-intensive  product  is  sold  into  a 
competitive  international  market.  There  is  an  economic  case  for  making 
payments to firms that cannot pass on increased costs associated with carbon 
pricing because competitors are not subject to comparable carbon constraints. It 
is,  however,  a  more  limited  case  than  is  supposed  in  most  of  the  Australian 
public policy discussion.  
The  valid  case  is  closely  analogous  to  the  case  for  measures  to  restrict 
“dumping” of subsidised foreign production onto the local market. 
The economically valid concern arising out of firms operating in Australia facing 
more stringent carbon constraints than overseas competitors is not that some 
Australian  firms  may  reduce  their  levels  of  production  or  investment.  Some 
reduction in output of some products would occur in a world in which there was 
comprehensive carbon pricing on a comparable basis. Such adjustments would 
be economically and environmentally efficient. 
The economically valid concern is that some Australian firms may reduce their 
levels of production and investment more than would have been the case if all 
competitors in other countries faced similar carbon constraints.  
The  aluminium  industry  can  illustrate  the  distinction  between  concern  for 
contraction of production or investment, and concern for excessive contraction.  The  smelting  of  aluminium  uses  electricity  intensively.  Electricity  can  be 
produced through high-emissions processes (at an extreme, through the use of 
brown  coal,  but  more  generally  through  the  use  of  coal),  or  low-emissions 
processes  (for  example,  geo-thermal  or  hydro-electricity).  Natural  gas  can  be 
used  to  generate  electricity  with  intermediate  emissions  intensity. 
Comprehensive global carbon pricing would provide incentives for production of 
aluminium based on coal to contract, and for production based on low-emissions 
electricity  generation  to  expand.  The  pressures  for  reducing  the  share  of  an 
emissions-intensive  producer—say,  Australia—in  global  production  does  not 
depend on the absence of carbon pricing in competing countries. Carbon pricing 
would  make  emissions-intensive  processing  less  competitive  even  if  it  were 
adopted everywhere in a similar way. 
With comprehensive carbon pricing, with similar constraints being applied in all 
countries  with  potential  for  economic  production  of  aluminium,  there  will  be 
strong upward pressure on costs of high-emissions production, but not on costs 
of  low-emissions  production.  If,  at  the  relevant  margins,  there  is  sufficient 
potential capacity at competitive prices to produce aluminium from low-emissions 
sources of electricity, there may be little upward pressure on global aluminium 
prices as a result of the introduction of a price on emissions. On the other hand, if 
the potential for additional low-emissions production of electricity for aluminium 
smelting  falls  well  short  of  the  industry’s  requirements,  the  increase  in  the 
aluminium price may reflect most or all of the effects of the emissions price on 
the cost of coal-based smelting. 
If, with comprehensive carbon constraints, the global aluminium price would have 
risen  more  or  less  in  line  with  the  costs  of  emissions  permits  in  Australia, 
comprehensive  carbon  pricing  would  generate  little  or  no  contraction  of 
Australian  production  or  investment.  However,  if  it  were  the  case  that 
comprehensive carbon constraints would have little effect on global aluminium 
prices,  there  would  be  considerable  pressure  for  reduction  in  production  and 
pricing. 
How metal prices would be affected by comprehensive carbon constraints is an 
empirical matter, which can be the subject of analysis using standard techniques. 
For aluminium, my guess is that analysis would show some tendency for upward 
pressure on prices as a result of comprehensive carbon constraints. These would 
weaken over time, as production patterns adjusted to the possibility of greater 
use of renewable sources of power. The effect on high-emissions, coal-based 
Australian production would probably be slight in the early years, but greater over 
time,  as  established  capacity  reached  the  end  of  its  economic  life.  Whether Australia  remained  a  major  aluminium  smelter  and  exporter  in  the  long-term  
would  depend  on  whether  it  was  able  to  become  a  competitive  source  of 
relatively  low-emissions  energy.  Australia’s  low-cost  potential  for  geo-
sequestration, bio-sequestration, and a wide range of renewable energy sources 
introduces  the  possibility  that  it  would  be  a  competitive  producer  of  energy-
intensive products.     
The anticipation of comprehensive carbon pricing has led to the search for sites 
for  aluminium  smelting  with  large  potential  for  generating  electricity  with  low 
emissions.  Examples  include  the  establishment  and  then  the  progressive 
expansion of BHP Billiton’s aluminium smelter in Mozambique and its studies of 
the  hydro-electric  potential  of  the  Congo;  Rio  Tinto’s  purchase  of  the  Alcan 
aluminium smelting capacity based on Quebec hydro-electricity resources; the 
emergence of Iceland as a major locus of aluminium smelting based on geo-
thermal and hydro-electric power; and the interest that several global aluminium 
producers are taking in the hydro-electric potential of Papua New Guinea.  
Any tendency for comprehensive global carbon pricing to inhibit investment in 
Australian  aluminium  smelting  may  turn  out  to  be  temporary.  Australia  has  a 
number of advantages in aluminium smelting independently of the availability of 
electricity that has low costs if and only if no price is placed on environmental 
externalities.  It  is  an  advantage  to  be  the  locus  of  mining  of  the  bulky  raw 
material. Australia has ready availability of a wide range of skills in the resources 
industries.  The  potential  for  new  production  of  low-emissions  electricity  in 
developing  countries  is  finite,  and  will  be  exhausted  sooner  rather  than  later. 
Australia’s  exceptional  opportunities  for  producing  low-emissions  electricity  is 
likely  again  to  be  a  source  of  comparative  advantage  in  energy  intensive 
industries once the “stranded” opportunities for low-emissions power resources in 
developing countries have been exhausted (Garnaut, 2008, Chapter 23).     
A valid case for payments to trade-exposed industries arising out of differences 
in  carbon  constraints  from  those  applying  in  our  trade  competitors  is  not 
established by evidence that the application of carbon  pricing in Australia will 
lead to lower levels of production.  
Rather, the concern is that the world is on its way towards comprehensive carbon 
pricing, and the absence for the time being of carbon pricing in some countries 
may cause some firms to reduce their production too far—that is, beyond the 
level  that  would  eventuate  if  and  when  competitor  countries  were  subject  to 
commensurate  carbon  constraints  (see  Attachment).  The  associated  loss  in 
productive  capacity  may  not  be  reversible  at  a  later  stage  when  a  carbon-
inclusive world price emerges in the relevant commodity and goods markets. In addition, new investment in trade-exposed, emissions-intensive industries may 
be  stalled  even  though  it  may  have  been  viable  had  all  competitors  adopted 
policies consistent with those of Australia.   
If the more favourable treatment of one industry within a competitor’s than in the 
home emissions regime were expected to be permanent, the Australian economy 
as a whole would do best if the overseas distortion were ignored, and Australian 
trade specialisation adjusted to the set of international prices that emerged from 
the  permanent  set  of  distorted  interventions.  But  it  is  not  expected  to  be 
permanent,  and  that  is  part  of  the  justification  for  transitional  support  for 
Australian production. 
Here  we have  a close  parallel  to  the  economically  rational  response  to  other 
countries’  subsidisation  of  traded  goods  industries.  First,  each  country  should 
seek the agreement of others on all countries removing removal of all subsidies, 
to support efficient resource allocation on a global basis. To the extent that it 
turns  out  to  be  impossible  to  get  other  countries  to  remove  subsidies,  each 
country will maximise the value of its own output if it accepts world prices as it 
finds  them,  and  specialises  in  production  of  those  products  that  are  most 
profitable in the world in which prices have been distorted by subsidies. 
That is not, however, the world in which emissions-reducing policies are being 
developed.  The  whole  purpose  of  introducing  constraints  on  emissions  in 
Australia is to be part of a global mitigation effort. We are working towards a 
comprehensive  international  carbon  pricing  regime.  There  will  be  no  effective 
global mitigation without it. We cannot give up on removal of pricing distortions 
across countries without giving up on effective mitigation itself. It is reasonable to 
treat differentials in carbon pricing as temporary, and to avoid changes in the 
structure  of  the  Australian  economy  that  are  dependent  on  temporary  price 
distortion. 
Therefore, under certain circumstances, there are environmental and economic 
reasons for establishing special arrangements for emissions-intensive industries 
that are trade-exposed.    
THE MISCONCEPTION AND THE SOLUTION 
The  Australian  public  policy  discussion  has  proceeded  on  the  basis  that 
compensation is warranted because Australia is introducing an emissions trading 
scheme. This leads to a quite different focus and outcome to that which emerges 
from an economically rigorous approach. It leads to focus on removing part or all 
of  the  costs  of  emissions  permits  to  trade-exposed  industries  if  it  can  be demonstrated  that  some  competing  producers  do  not  face  comparable 
constraints. 
No government is comfortable about subjecting its traded sector to an additional 
impost  when  its  trade  competitors  are  not  willing  to  take  comparable  policy 
measures.  However,  to  give  way  to  the  superficially  attractive  approach  of 
compensating for the domestic imposts means either one of two things. It may 
mean  compromising  heavily  compromising  a  national  commitment  to  reduce 
emissions.  Or  it  means  increasing  the  burden  on  non-traded  sectors  of  the 
economy—most notably, and ultimately, domestic households. To compensate 
trade-exposed firms fully for Australia imposing costs on emissions would place 
large additional burdens on the economy as a whole and on other interests. This 
approach allows no logical limits to “compensation”. The inevitable consequence 
of such an approach is the encouragement of pleading for special treatment.  
These are dreadful problems for every country’s emissions trading scheme or 
emissions tax in the absence of a comprehensive global agreement. The issue 
has the potential to corrupt public policy processes with implications beyond the 
emissions  trading  scheme,  and  to  destabilise  public  support  for  mitigation 
policies. Internationally, it can have the effect of systematically excluding many of 
the most emissions-intensive industries from the emissions constraints that are 
required throughout the economy if the risks of dangerous climate change are to 
be  held  to  acceptable  levels.  The  progressive  exclusion  of  trade-exposed 
industries  by  arrangements  that  differ  across  countries  makes  the  details  of 
emissions  trading schemes  rather than  underlying comparative advantage  the 
determinant of competitive advantage in the resources industries. 
Australia  has  more  to  lose  than  any  other  developed  country  from  an 
internationally fractured, unprincipled and partial approach to dealing with trade-
exposed  industries.  We  are  one  of  the  world’s  largest  exporter  of  many 
emissions-intensive  tradeable  products,  and  proportionately  to  the  size  of  the 
economy easily the largest amongst developed countries. Clear rules based on 
sound principles are a necessary protection for countries that would do well on a 
level  playing  field.  Behind  the  fog  of  differentiated  arrangements  for  trade 
exposed industries will emerge a range of protectionist interventions that will be 
especially  damaging  to  Australia.  The  growth  of  protection  behind  the  fog  of 
differentiated  arrangements  for  shielding  trade-exposed  industries  will  be 
especially  tempting  and  costly,  albeit  deeply  counterproductive,  as  many 
countries seek to find their ways out of deep recession in the period ahead. 
How  can  Australia  provide  support  for  trade-exposed  industries  where  it  is 
warranted, while avoided the risks of unprincipled arrangements? The immediacy of the problem requires a three-pronged approach. This is not a 
matter  of  choosing  one  or  other  of  three  prongs.  Two  of  the  options  rely  on 
international agreements. The third is a domestic arrangement that could pave 
the way for an international approach. The three options are: 
(i)  A comprehensive global agreement on mitigation under which all major 
emitters  have  national  emissions  limits.  Trade  in  emissions 
entitlements will then establish similar carbon pricing in all economies, 
even  if  the  limits  are  set  much  more  stringently  for  some  than  for 
others (Garnaut 2008, Chapters 9 and 10).  
(ii) Sectoral climate change agreements for our most exposed industries that 
establish  similar  carbon  constraints  amongst  major  competitors  for 
particular industries.  
(iii)  Domestic assistance measures for our most trade-exposed industries that 
remove the effects of major competitors having failed for the time being 
to establish comparable carbon constraints.  
I will focus on the transitional domestic assistance arrangements.  
The representations from business on shielding trade-exposed industries are all 
predicated on the view that 
--nothing is happening elsewhere in the world 
--nothing will happen elsewhere in the world 
--nothing done by Australia makes any difference to what happens elsewhere in 
the world. 
They  are  also  predicated  on  the  view  that  these  premises  make  a  case  for 
compensation for the fact that Australia is imposing an emissions constraint. As 
has  already  been  discussed,  economic  analysis  from  a  national  perspective 
indicates  that  if  these  premises  were  sound,  no  assistance  at  all  would  be 
warranted. But they are not sound, so that there is a valid case for transitional 
assistance.  
The  correct  approach  to  provision  of  assistance  is  based  on  the  following 
principle: 
For  every  unit  of  production,  eligible  firms  receive  a  credit 
against their permit obligations equivalent to the uplift in world 
price  for  their  product  that  would  eventuate  if  our  trading 
competitors had policies similar to our own. This formula is conceptually sound. Because it is based on a clear principle, it 
has defined limits, and so does not lend itself to unbounded negotiations and 
unbounded calls on the public finances. 
The  clear  limits  to  calls  on  the  public  finances  that  are  associated  with  the 
principled  approach  to  shielding  trade-exposed  industries  holds  open  the 
prospects of funding high levels of public support for research, development and 
commercialisation out of revenue from sale of permits. Substantial public support 
for innovation in the new technologies is an essential component of successful 
domestic mitigation policies as well as of an effective international agreement. 
The  open-ended  nature  of  fiscal  commitments  under  the  arrangements  for 
assisting trade-exposed industries that have been implemented in Europe (with 
increasing awareness of the costs and increasing determination to reduce the 
costs), and which have been the focus of most of the Australian discussion and 
as reflected in the Commonwealth’s White Paper (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2008)  make  public  expenditure  to  support  innovation  dependent  on 
appropriations of funds from outside the mitigation policy system. 
The proposed principle is simple. It can be applied using standard approaches to 
modelling  global  markets  that  are  familiar  to  economists,  including  to  many 
working within the world’s large resources companies.  
The  proposed  principle    ensures  that  firms  are  encouraged  to  invest  and  to 
produce to levels that are sustainable in the context of a global agreement, but 
they are not required to bear the full cost of doing so until there is an agreement.  
It rewards firms that might be described as early movers but does not penalise 
other  producers.  It  encourages  firms  that  invest  successfully  in  applying  low-
emissions processes, and does not reward investment in lobbying. 
Whereas  the  European  Union  and  Australian  White  Paper  approach  invites 
competitive protectionist responses amongst countries that are likely to escalate 
over  time,  the  principled  approach  lends  itself  to  stable  international 
arrangements. It is easily and usefully reproduced in other countries. Indeed, it is 
a reasonable hope that one country’s adoption of the approach would encourage 
its  emulation  by  others.  Two  or  more  economies  applying  the  approach  and 
connected by trade in emissions permits, and therefore subject to  a common 
carbon  price,  could  share  the  analysis  of  prices  and  appropriate  assistance 
payments.  
Unlike the input-based compensation approaches that have dominated the policy 
debate and are embodied in the White Paper on the emissions trading system, 
this  approach  fully  accounts  for  the  policies  of  competitors,  now  and  as  they evolve  over  time.  In  this  sense  it  is  self-correcting.  Payments  at  appropriate 
levels continue in full so long as other countries do not apply comparable carbon 
constraints.  They  are  phased  out  automatically  as  constraints  are  imposed 
elsewhere,  whether  unilaterally,  through  sectoral  agreements,  or  through 
comprehensive agreements.  
This formulation for calculating payments ensures undistorted price signals for 
Australian  business  from  the  commencement  of  the  scheme.  Firms  face 
incentives that accurately reflect those that will emerge from sectoral and then 
global agreements. Australian businesses will only reduce domestic production if 
that is consistent with long-term comparative advantage in a world of full costing 
of carbon externalities. 
The  Attachment  illustrates  the  economic  analysis  underlying  the  proposed 
approach. 
ADMINISTERING  A  PRINCIPLED  APPROACH  TO  SUPPORTING  TRADE-
EXPOSED INDUSTRIES 
The approach to assistance for trade-exposed industries proposed in the Review 
and explained in this paper would improve the prospects of effective mitigation. It 
would  diminish  the  prospects  of  large-scale  distortions  in  domestic  resource 
allocation and political economy, as well as in the international trading system. 
The approach is new in public discussion and in administration, and so will raise 
a number of issues related to its administration. 
As  with  the  administration  of  customs  and  taxation,  the  size  of  potential 
payments  suggests  the  merits  of  delegating  administrative  judgements  to  an 
independent entity—initially  national, and as soon as possible international by 
agreement amongst two or more economies. 
The independent authority would need to be established with the necessary skills 
to develop carbon-inclusive world price models for relevant markets.  
The  calculation  of  expected  price  uplift  factors,  the  frequency  and  timing  of 
allocation of credits to eligible firms, and the relevant accounting rules should all 
operate to ensure minimum disruption and maximum certainty. Expected price 
uplift factors would be produced by the independent authority at regular intervals 
(at a minimum, annually), through a transparent and consultative process. The 
process  applied  by  the  Australian  Productivity  Commission  in  inquiries  on 
protection matters would be a suitable model. In an open economy like Australia, there are few completely “non-traded” goods. 
It would be excessively demanding of administrative resources for payments to 
be  made  to  every  firm  that  is  affected  to  a  small  degree  by  the  absence  of 
comparable  emissions  pricing  in  other  economies,  irrespective  of  materiality. 
There would need to be a materiality threshold. 
An  eligibility  threshold  is  defined  most  appropriately  in  terms  of  the  expected 
uplift in the unit sales in percentage terms, in the given compliance period, such 
that  
--only products that are expected to increase in price by a percentage in excess 
of a low threshold would attract credits under the scheme 
--eligible producers would receive credits for that part of the expected price uplift 
that is in excess of the threshold.   
THE  PROSPECTS  FOR  THE  AUSTRALIAN  AGRICULTURE  AND 
RESOURCES INDUSTRIES 
Like the Australian economy as a whole, but especially so, the agricultural and 
resources industries would be big losers from unmitigated climate change. Like 
the economy as a whole, but more so, they would each face significant costs that 
were  not  balanced  by  benefits  in  the  early  stages  of  an  Australian  mitigation 
regime.  They  would  each  fare  much  better  within  a  comprehensive,  global 
regime  of  emissions  constraints,  and  have  a  powerful  interest  in  rapid 
advancement towards such a world. 
Amongst much else, agreement on a comprehensive system of carbon pricing 
would remove the risk of ad hoc arrangements, differing from country to country, 
leading to the proliferation of protectionist devices in the guise of compensation 
for the fact that competitors not having comparable carbon pricing. 
In the meantime, the integrity of Australian policy processes, of Australian and 
international  mitigation  and  of  the  multilateral  trading  system  all  require  the 
adoption  of  transitional  assistance  that  compensates  domestic  producers  for 
other countries not having comparable carbon pricing, rather than for the home 
country placing a price on emissions. Such an approach has large advantages 
for Australia acting alone. It has much larger advantages for Australia and for the 
world if it is adopted in many countries.  
  
ATTACHMENT 
Refer to Box 14.5, Chapter 14, Garnaut Climate Change Review, Cambridge 
University Press, Melbourne, pp. 246-247. Online at www.garnautreview.org.au    
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